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Forging a Bipartisan and Strategic Approach
to Foreign Affairs
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI*
OPENING ADDRESS
One of the guests invited to the conference was the Vice Presi-
dent. Unfortunately, he could not be with us, but he has written me
the following letter.
Dear Zbig,
I would like to think I played a small part in inspiring this
event when I addressed the Federalist Society last January on the
struggle between the executive and legislative Branches over the
conduct of our Foreign Policy. The Iran-Contra Affair, the events
in the Persian Gulf, and the debate over the interpretation of the
ABM Treaty all underscore the timeliness and importance of your
discussions. The impressive lineup of panels and speakers for the
conference shows that you have brought together some of the
Nation's best minds to conduct a balanced examination of these
important issues. I hope that the conference will address some of
the reasons for our current situation, as well as concrete proposals
for structural change. I look forward to hearing back from you
soon on any conclusions you reach. Once again, I wish you success
with this most important endeavor.
Sincerely,
George Bush
A successful symposium requires not only the presentation of
contending views, but also their interaction. It is from a creative
exchange of views that we all benefit the most. I am, therefore, very
pleased to chair this symposium assembled by the Federalist Society,
particularly because it deals with a most timely and important topic-
foreign affairs and the Constitution.
Who makes national security policy is not an idle question for
academic debate. How we answer this question in practice deter-
mines America's capacity to act in the world. This, in turn, affects
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not only our ability to ensure the survival and security of the United
States, but also our capacity to affect the future course of world
events. The subject of this symposium is especially timely, given the
current tensions between the executive and legislative branches---and
among contending factions within Congress itself-over the Ameri-
can role in the Persian Gulf. This debate highlights what I consider
to be the political dimension in the constitutional struggle over for-
eign policy. Without prejudging our panels' conclusions on the spe-
cific aspects of the subject, I would like to address a few remarks to
the political dimension, for I believe it to be central to any reasonable
management of the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches. Let me repeat that I intend to focus on the political, not the
legal or constitutional, aspects of the dilemma.
As a point of departure, we must recognize two very obvious
facts. First, in the last fifteen years, the balance in the movable,
dynamic relationship between the executive and legislative branches
has clearly shifted from the President to the Congress. Congress has
become more active, more involved, perhaps even more central, in the
shaping of national security policy. This has resulted from a variety
of factors, but it is certainly a fact of life. Second, we must recognize
that an inherent ambiguity exists in the Constitution, regarding the
proper boundaries of the prerogatives of the legislative and the execu-
tive branches. Quite simply, the Constitution does not hand down
clear-cut guidelines for the process of shaping national security policy.
It gives neither the legislative, nor the executive branch, exclusive
powers in this area. These powers are not separated, but instead, are
blended between the two branches.
The President has specific powers accorded to him by the Consti-
tution, such as the treatymaking power. Furthermore, the President
has all the powers inherent in national sovereignty, not explicitly
given to Congress, and those powers implied by his role as Com-
mander-in-Chief. Yet Congress has the power to declare war, and the
Senate has the power to ratify, or reject, treaties. The legislative
branch also has the decisive role in the budgetary process, and the
exercise of that role clearly affects national security policy. All of this
means that the relationship between the executive and the legislative
branches is, inevitably, a fluid one. Determinate power will shift in
one direction, and then another, depending on the prevailing political
circumstances. This fluid accommodation is a part of our constitu-
tional tradition, and is quite normal as such. In recent years, how-
ever, our flexible arrangements have become less manageable, more
polarized, and even gridlocked.
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I would like to comment briefly on the causes of some of our
current difficulties. The first is the collapse of bipartisanship. The
delicate, informal, and flexible relationship between the executive and
the legislative branches in foreign affairs operates differently in the
context of bipartisanship, than it does in the context of partisanship.
The United States has been engaged as a major power in the world for
forty years. For roughly the first twenty, we shaped our foreign pol-
icy largely on the basis of bipartisanship, which inevitably affected the
nature of the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches. It made for a greater mutual trust through a more auto-
matic, although informal, process of consultation. Bipartisan consen-
sus also meant that both branches shared certain common
assumptions. I emphasize the word "assumptions" because a great
deal of our foreign policy operates on automatically shared assump-
tions, rather than deliberately framed strategy.
In this country, we do not have a tradition of shaping a geostra-
tegic approach to foreign policy, but rather, we have a tradition of
responding to certain basic, commonly shared feelings. There is no
doubt, for example, that our Anglophile feelings had a lot to do with
the emergence of the Anglo-American alliance in World War II, and
with the special relationship between the United States and Great
Britain, that remains after the war and extends into the alliance that
we undertook with Europe. After twenty years, however, the tradi-
tion of bipartisanship in foreign policy collapsed in the course of the
Vietnamese War. Today, alternative, partisan conceptions color a
great deal of the dialogue on foreign policy issues. These conceptions
are based on increasingly different assumptions about the world, the
uses of power, the nature of the threat, American values, and Ameri-
can priorities.
A partisan approach to foreign policy inevitably affects the rela-
tionship between the executive and legislative branches, especially if
one party controls Congress, and the other holds the White House.
When there is a partisan split between these branches of government,
policy differences inevitably intensify, further complicating the pro-
cess of making sound policy. It subjects foreign policy to partisan
debate and maneuvering, and encourages the legislative branch to
counterpose itself to the executive branch on the nature of strategic
issues.
The second problem which has compounded tensions between
the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy is our
national tendency to confuse strategy with tactics. We do not have a
strategic tradition in this country, nor do we have a tradition of artic-
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ulating a set of explicit strategic assumptions that clearly define our
priorities. We often fail to distinguish central strategic fronts from
peripheral fronts in our conflict with the Soviets. We tend to be
driven toward a policymaking process, in which tactical considera-
tions become dominant. As a result, tactics tend to shape the sub-
stance of strategy.
Consider, for example, a current issue in the forefront of public
attention: the Iran-Contra debate. This problem would not have
become acute had there been a deeper awareness of the strategic issues
involved. Such an awareness would not have allowed the issue of the
hostages in Lebanon to become paramount. It also would have facili-
tated a greater discrimination in the choice of tactics designed to save
the strategic objective of renewing the American-Iranian relationship.
Yet the preoccupation with tactics became so strong, and the choice
of tactics became so bizarre in the end, that the ultimate strategic
objective of the enterprise was overshadowed, and finally negated.
In the context of the collapse of bipartisanship, this second prob-
lem has become intertwined with the debate between the executive
and legislative branches. The United States simply has not cultivated
a process of devising and articulating a national strategy. Rather, the
national strategy is periodically revised, and then tactics are adapted
to serve it. The confluence of these problems has led Congress to leg-
islate tactics, rather than debate strategy. The executive branch,
which is prey to the same preoccupation, often compounds the prob-
lem by emphasizing tactics without thinking seriously about strategic
assumptions.
The third problem in the formation of a coherent foreign policy
is the absence of adequate and sufficiently serious consultation
between the executive and legislative branches, regarding strategic
matters. Presidents have tended not to engage their colleagues in
Congress on this issue, and the executive branch lacks an adequately
developed mechanisms to do so.
The National Security Council could serve as a vehicle to pro-
mote such a dialogue on strategy. One of the Council's proper roles is
to advise the President on the development of a strategic approach to
the world, and to coordinate the actions of the different executive
departments: the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and the respective intelligence communities. That is how the
National Security Adviser should see his role; yet, he is unable to
appear before Congress to explain his efforts, or his assumptions. If
he does so informally, he is often viewed by those in the traditional
executive departments-such as the Department of State-as usurp-
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ing their legitimate role. This, in turn, further inhibits the process of
promoting a dialogue on strategy.
I know from my own experience that whenever I appeared on
Capitol Hill to meet with Senators or Congressmen, I could only do
so informally, and even then, only under quasi-surreptitious circum-
stances, that were almost inevitably followed by recriminations from
the Department of State on the grounds that I was usurping its role.
Yet, the Department of State does not, and cannot, shape national
security policy. It too often confuses diplomacy with foreign policy,
forgetting that diplomacy is only one aspect of foreign policy. Mili-
tary power, covert activity, financial power, intelligence, and threat
assessment are all part of the process of making a national security
policy. Diplomacy is but one component.
The fourth problem of shaping foreign policy is the nature of
modern warfare and its threat to our national survival, both of which
have altered the dimensions of the decisionmaking of the Executive.
Modern circumstances, in particular, have compressed the time avail-
able for critical decisionmaking under circumstances of the most dire
threat.
We live in an age in which we are always faced with the poten-
tial-I repeat, potential--danger of having to make critical life and
death decisions under the most incredible pressure. This inevitably
complicates the constitutional responsibilities of the executive branch,
vis-a-vis the legislative branch. In the event of a nuclear conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the President would
have approximately four minutes to make the most difficult and most
critical decisions. If the Soviet Union initiates a nuclear strike at
night, the National Security Adviser would wake up the President
roughly three minutes after the launch of the Soviet missiles. The
President would then have to consult with the National Security
Adviser, and roughly, from the fourth to the eighth minute, review
certain, rather complex procedures, and engage in critical decision-
making with some other key individuals. The President would then
have to choose among several options, and undertake certain deci-
sions whose execution would have to be initiated, roughly, from the
eighth to the tenth minute.
Clearly, these procedures literally require a few individuals to
assume an enormous amount of responsibility. They pose a question
that is enormously sensitive and of the utmost national importance.
This question obviously affects both how we operate as a nation, and
how we make policy under the most dire of circumstances. Yet, these
procedures cannot be governed by the conventional guidelines con-
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tained in the Constitution that govern the declaration and conduct of
war.
Given the compressed time available for decisionmaking under
such circumstances, there would be an unavoidable collision between
constitutional provisions and actual real life situations. Here, concen-
tration of command and control of authority in the hands of a single
person must be ensured in order to prevent political decapitation.
Without this, our ability to initiate a retaliatory strike, and therefore,
the credibility of our deterrence threat, would come into question.
The Carter administration was the first, in some twenty years, to
exercise these complex crisis procedures. The executive branch, par-
ticularly the President, has to be both versed in, and prepared for,
these critical procedures. There is no time to learn them in the event
of a real crisis. The survivability of our government under the cir-
cumstances of modern warfare requires attention to this matter, not
only for the purpose of fighting war-should that become necessary-
but primarily for that of deterrence. In this regard, it seems inevitable
that the Congress must delegate authority to the President.
The fifth problem complicating relations between the executive
and legislative branches involves covert action. Today, there are
widely divergent perceptions about the role of covert activity in our
national security policy. Few would dispute that there is a need, from
time to time, for covert activity. It is a legitimate form of interna-
tional action, designed to obtain desired political objectives. It can
involve supporting foreign trade unions, counteracting disinformation
in the foreign press, influencing key foreign decisionmakers, or exer-
cising other forms of persuasion. Some of these actions are relatively
harmless and risk-free, while others carry serious consequences and
involve great risks to the individuals concerned in undertaking them.
Can such activities be undertaken without consulting the legisla-
tive branch? The answer is clearly no. Some consultations are neces-
sary. Yet if there is such consultation, can it be achieved with the
security needed for the operation to succeed? Unfortunately, my own
experience in the White House, and recent experience more generally,
indicates that the chances for success in this context are not quite
certain. Both the executive and legislative branches must ensure that
leaks will not compromise policymaking, so as to place into jeopardy
not only the objectives of the operation, but also the safety of individ-
uals engaged in these potentially hazardous actions. Any leak
destroys the needed mutual confidence between the legislative and
executive branches, thereby complicating the ability of individuals of
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goodwill on both sides to undertake the needed cooperation for inte-
grating covert action into our overall national policy.
In a sense, all of these problems are crystallized in the War Pow-
ers Resolution, which represents the outcome of a profound struggle
over the proper lines of authority for the exercise of military force by
the United States. After the end of the American involvement in the
Vietnam War, there was a pervasive fear in the Congress that the
executive branch had overstepped its constitutional authority during
that conflict. That was the political context in which the Resolution
was passed. Since then, no President has invoked its procedures, nor
even conceded the constitutionality of its provisions. The issues it
raises are genuine political problems that need to be addressed, but
the Resolution may not have been a proper response to those issues,
and it may not, now, provide proper answers to the real dilemmas we
face, specifically those that I have tried to outline.
The problems connected with the War Powers Resolution have
been particularly evident in the continuing debate over the American
role in the Persian Gulf. Congress wants President Reagan to invoke
the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, and there have even
been fitful movements to force him to do so. At the same time, how-
ever, it is clear that there is no consensus in Congress concerning our
policy objectives, or our tactical requirements. Congress has debated,
literally for months, about the proper role for American military
forces in this region. There is a general consensus that the United
States has interests in the Gulf that need to be protected. Beyond
that, however, Congress cannot agree about the specific role that
America should assume. Are our forces simply on a symbolic mission
to show the flag? Should we require cooperation from our Arab
friends in the Gulf before putting our forces there? Should we protect
the reflagged tankers? Should we protect our Arab friends from Ira-
nian attacks? Should we retaliate in the event of Iranian attacks on
our forces? If so, what should be the character of the retaliation?
Congress will not give the President a blank check in the Gulf;
however, it cannot formulate the legislative language to cope with the
myriad of rapidly changing contingencies involved in our action. In
brief, Congress cannot act as if it were the Commander-in-Chief. I
mention this to highlight the fact that, over the last fifteen years, a
pattern has developed in the relationship between the executive and
legislative branches that creates serious difficulties that cannot be ulti-
mately resolved by legislation or formal arrangements. Repealing the
War Powers Resolution would not solve the problem, in spite of
everything that I have said about it. Alone, repeal would not auto-
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matically restore a proper balance. The difficulty does not arise from a
deficiency in the statutes; rather, it is a political problem. What is
needed is a process of political accommodation and adjustment that
takes into account the global circumstances of the United States, and
the political and constitutional realities at home.
It is with this in mind that I would now like to share five sugges-
tions that might be helpful in dealing with these problems. I would
like to note that I said "in dealing with," not "resolving," these
problems. We are faced not with a puzzle that can be solved given
enough ingenuity, but rather with a condition inherent in the com-
plexity of our constitutional arrangement.
The first suggestion involves a deliberate quest for a greater
degree of bipartisanship. For the sake of a better relationship between
the executive and legislative branches in the area of national security
policy, it is important and desirable that a more deliberate effort be
made, particularly by the President, to move the country back toward
some genuine degree of bipartisanship. This is not a pious wish, and
it is not a prayer. Bipartisanship does not happen by itself, and it is
not a gift from the gods. Rather, it is a relationship that is accom-
plished through patient, deliberate work. I believe that President
Reagan has missed a very major opportunity to move in this
direction.
When he came into office, President Reagan had a unique, broad
mandate, particularly in the area of national security policy. His was
a special, unprecedented opportunity in the post-Vietnam period. He
was the first President, to my knowledge, who had as a member of his
transition team a former Presidential candidate of the opposite party
working on the issue of national security. If the President had
appointed Senator Henry Jackson to be Secretary of Defense, he
would have taken a giant step towards achieving bipartisanship.
That is the way it was done under Presidents Truman and Eisen-
hower. They shared powers with responsible members of the opposite
party with whom a certain degree of shared consensus existed. I
would like to stress that these things have to be done deliberately. I
often urged President Carter to work more closely with Senator How-
ard Baker, and they both tried. In my judgment, however, our
administration did not try hard enough. We did not go the last mile
in this regard. We made no effort to draw members of the opposite
party into our administration.
The first step must be taken by the executive branch, and then
the legislative branch must respond. Future administrations must
make a truly serious effort to enhance bipartisanship, in order to deal
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with the political problems inherent in the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs.
The second suggestion involves a more deliberate formulation of
national strategy. We need a strategic process-a method for devel-
oping a more coherent approach to our national security. This
method must respect the needed distinction between strategy and tac-
tics, and involve joint participation by the executive and legislative
branches. We can no longer shape national strategy, or deal with
strategic questions, simply by relying on the decisions of the Presi-
dent, his National Security Adviser, and his Secretaries of State and
Defense. We are no longer living in an age, as we were in World War
II, in which foreign policy is the exclusive prerogative of the executive
branch.
Ad hoc consultations are not enough. Rather, an established
process of consultation is needed. It would be desirable for the Presi-
dent to use the National Security Council meetings, on a roughly
monthly basis, for enlarged consultations with the top congressional
leadership, regarding strategic matters. These would not be decision-
making meetings, and thus, would maintain the distinction between
the executive and the legislative branches. They would be a way to
engage congressional leaders in the process--for the entire national
security policymaking process needs their input and involvement. In
these meetings, the President and congressional leaders would discuss
our national strategic objectives. Our leaders would define our goals,
identify our priorities, distinguish between central and peripheral
issues, and shape the guidelines for the exercise of our powers and
diplomacy. Such meetings could begin to close the pernicious gap
between these two branches of our government and could establish,
more generally, a sense of shared direction.
The third suggestion involves appointing former congressional
figures to top executive slots in the area of national security poli-
cymaking. I think it would be useful for our Presidents to look at this
possibility more closely. I do not think it should become an estab-
lished practice, nor should it become a pervasive practice, but I do
think that it would be helpful if one of the three principal presidential
advisers-the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or the
National Security Adviser-was a well-respected and well-informed
former senior Congressman or senior Senator who shares the Presi-
dent's strategic perspectives. Such an appointee would become a dis-
tinct, informal link with the Congress. Something along these lines is
absolutely essential if we are going to redress current tensions between
the executive and legislative branches, particularly the present trend
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towards micromanagement of foreign policy among 535 putative Sec-
retaries of State or Defense.
The fourth suggestion is that we consider the possibility of hav-
ing the National Security Adviser make regular, but informal, appear-
ances before pertinent congressional committees. There have only
been two kinds of National Security Advisers over the years: those
who play a useful role, and those who are irrelevant. If the individual
plays the role he should be playing, he should be accessible on a lim-
ited, informal, yet regular, basis to the Congress, in order to help
shape the needed executive and legislative branch consensus. The fact
is that the Secretary of State cannot truly articulate national security
strategy because his department cannot produce it for him. His
department is essentially preoccupied with negotiations, and it has
excellent people for that objective.
The same is true of the Secretary of Defense. This position
requires someone who works closely with the President, who shares
the President's strategic policy and bureaucratic perspectives, and
who has legitimate authority to speak on behalf of the President with
an overall strategic view, and to share that view informally with the
congressional leadership.
Finally, it would also help if we had a single joint intelligence
committee in the Congress. I think that the existence of two commit-
tees with two staffs creates some of the difficulties that we have exper-
ienced. Too many people are involved under the present system,
making a shambles of any effort to conduct responsible, serious con-
sultations. I believe that a single committee with strictly defined rules
of procedure, both for its staff and its members, would help a great
deal to infuse mutual confidence and mutual trust into the policy-
making process. This, in turn, would make the intelligence agencies
of the executive branch much more confident in fully consulting and
sharing their views, aspirations, and problems with the legislative
branch, as certainly should be the case.
This critique and these suggestions certainly will not resolve the
problems inherent in the relationship between the executive and the
legislative branches in the area of national security. No comprehen-
sive solution is possible because the problems are inherent in our con-
stitutional structure. Nonetheless, steps in the directions I have
indicated might help to fashion a more favorable political context for
executive and legislative branch decisionmaking, that would be better
designed to mobilize public support for foreign policy, and to generate
greater strategic consistency in our foreign policymaking.
None of my suggestions are designed to establish the supremacy
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of one branch over the other. Rather, they reflect the recognition-
based both on study and very direct personal experience-that in our
system, neither side has ultimate supremacy, and that efforts to
achieve supremacy by either side would be counterproductive to the
national security policymaking process of the United States.
Our political system works well only when it is guided by the
spirit of compromise. The quest for unilateral domination can only
produce enmity or gridlock. I offer these views in the conviction that
the cooperative balance is not only clearly desirable, but is, in fact,
politically feasible. The point of departure for a remedy to our cur-
rent dilemmas is, in fact, in the realm of politics.
